The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) has recently updated a number of military concepts, which have since been approved by the EU Military Committee (the EU's highest military body). This task is carried out on a regular basis, but deserves particular attention in 2008.

While some of the documents are extremely technical, others are more strategic, particularly those on military planning and force generation, on which Europoliticsfocused its analysis.

The documents are full of off-putting abbreviations and apparently complex procedures, but beyond the technical and administrative constraints, they set out the doctrine of cooperation between EU member states for preparing military operations, in a context where European troops are directly exposed, for missions that do not automatically come within the EU's immediate security interests (prevention or peacekeeping on behalf of the United Nations). They therefore comprise an underlying political dimension that is more important than it might seem at first sight.

This updating also occurs at a turning point for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Five years on from Operation Artemis in the Congo (where a number of concepts were established) and the introduction of the first EU security and defence strategy, it serves as a prelude for the updating of the ESDP, set for the end of 2008. In practice, it takes account of the possibility of anticipating crises and is in keeping with the measures agreed at the Wiesbaden informal Council, under German Presidency, on 1 and 2 March 2007 (dubbed 'post-Wiesbaden' measures by military experts) at a time when new areas of action are emerging (see box).

ADVANCE PLANNING

The concept of military planning at strategic and political level is particularly well developed because it reflects the originality of EU military intervention, ie that it encompasses a wide range of instruments (political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military).

Planning is carried out at four levels, from the highest – EU institutional level – to the closest to the ground, component headquarters (tactical level), with the strategic (operation headquarters, OHQ) and operational levels (force headquarters, FHQ) in between. It traditionally includes three phases: preparing options, considering all alternatives and conducting final plans.

The bulk of this task falls on the EU Military Staff. It works continuously, in advance, to inform decision makers and enable them to take the decisions necessary for beginning real planning as early as possible. This advance planning is "essential for reducing EU crisis response time". It can be "generic" (operations where not all factors are fully identified) or "possible" (all factors of an operation have been identified). In the latter case, this includes an indication of the resources required and the deployment options considered. Planning also occurs in response to a crisis, in advance of or concomitantly with the political decision making process.

This process begins "as soon as an emerging crisis is identified by the EU at political level". It generally leads to the drafting of three documents by the EU Military Staff.

1. The crisis management concept (CMC) is the conceptual framework document describing the EU's general approach to management of a specific crisis. As soon as the CMC is adopted, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) instructs the Military Staff to study the military strategic options (MSO directive).

2. The military strategic options (MSO) explore specific military actions and the resources necessary, which includes an evaluation of feasibility and risks. The MSO must also include the targeted objective, the crisis resolution strategy, the objectives of the military commitment and the degree of force. The Council then selects an option and decides to trigger the operation (adoption of a joint action).

3. The initiating military directive (IMD) provides – based on the option selected by the Council – a clear description of the operation's political and military objectives and the mission assigned to the troops to meet the objectives. It also includes certain political restrictions that the operation commander must consider when drafting the concept of operations (Conops) and the provisional statement of requirements (PSOR), as well as the operation plan (OpPlan) and the rules of engagement request (ROEREQ).

This sequence, explains the document, must be seen as an ideal than as mandatory. In practice, due to time or event-related constraints, steps can be skipped. A fair amount of "flexibility and pragmatism" has to be applied throughout the process.

Military planning at political and strategic level does not cease when the directive is issued. The EU Military Staff provides planning support for the operation with the aim of guaranteeing a "smooth transition" from the planning process at political and strategic level to the military level. And when the operation is launched, the strategic environment must continue to be monitored and analyses and evaluations are still needed.

FORCE GENERATION

With its force generation process, the European Union works with the member states to put together the troops needed for a military operation outside the EU. Without "significant offers from the member states [...] an EU-led military operation cannot be launched". Similarly, limitations imposed by the participating countries on their military commitment "can also endanger the launch and/or the success of an operation".

While it is generally the role of the operation commander (OpCdr) to provide the degree of detail necessary for force generation in the concept of operations (ConOps) and the operation plan (OpPlan), the EU Military Staff submits an initial estimate of the required capabilities.

When rapid response is required, the quick designation of the operation commander, the simultaneous activation of the force headquarters on the ground and the operation headquarters, as well as the identification of the command structures and capabilities required will "accelerate the process". The mechanisms described in the air and maritime rapid response concepts can serve as a framework for the creation of additional forces. Likewise, the battlegroups on alert may use them to identify the assets and capabilities needed.

The force generation process includes three phases: identification, activation and deployment.

1. The identification phase must start as early as possible. During preparation of the crisis management concept, indicative contribution meetings, led by the Military Staff, can give the member states an advance indication of the means required on the basis of the initial military evaluations and analyses.

The commitments made at these meetings are not mandatory. In all cases, the member states must provide indications before the Council selects a military strategic option (MSO). Consultations with non-EU countries must also take place at this stage to brief them on the European Union's intentions.

The participating states must indicate all restrictions that limit their forces as soon as possible. A "significant number of limitations could result in an increase in the size of the force required".

Any requirement for rapid response force elements — for example, reconnaissance and intelligence (Istar), the Civil-Military Cell (Cimic), psychological operations (PsyOps) — requires prior consultations with the member states.

This preparatory work will then be taken into account by the operation commander during the development of the ConOps.

2. The activation phase. Once the ConOps is approved, and on the basis of a provisional statement of requirements (PSOR), the operation commander launches the force activation. This process starts "as early as possible and could be conducted simultaneously with the final steps of the force identification phase". A table sums up the specific requirements, their place of installation, the size of units, their armament, length of engagement and command. An activation warning message (EU Actwarn) with this information is transmitted to the member states. It also shows key planning dates, in particular for the force generation conferences. The member states must respond to the message with an informal offer, including whether they intend to take a leading role in any area. The role of the generation conferences – chaired by the operation commander – then consists of confirming the level and specific features of the national contributions.

The operation commander then issues a second message, the EU activation request (EU Actreq) setting out all the important data on the use of committed forces (geographical, logistics, time-related, rules of engagement). The member states must respond with "formal" commitments through the force preparation message (EU ForcePrep). If necessary, the operation commander may convene one or more "force balancing conferences" to address any shortfall or surplus commitment.

Once the operation commander concludes that the force needs are met, or that shortfalls are not critical to mission execution, he releases the EU force list, which confirms the commitments of the participating states. This list is included in the operation plan. Approval of the OpPlan by the Council authorises the operation commander to issue the activation order (EU ActOrd).

If the commitments do not meet required levels, and the operation commander concludes that he cannot fulfil the mission, he reports to the PSC.

Throughout this phase, the simultaneous activation and build-up of operation headquarters (OHQ) and force headquarters (FHQ) is a priority.

3. The deployment phase. Initiated by the activation order, this phase includes the assembly of the forces, their deployment and the transfer of authority from the member states to the operation commander. This is one of the strengths of EU military operations: the forces committed are no longer under the authority of their member states, but are answerable to the EU (barring certain exceptions duly established during the earlier phases). This transfer represents the final stage of the force generation process.

The concepts are available at www.europolitics.info > Search > 230401

History of concepts

A number of concepts have been developed by the EU Military Staff since 2000, particularly after the military operation in the Congo in 2003: military planning at the political and strategic level (25 September 2001*), force generation (26 September 2002*), military rapid response (24 January 2003), strategic movement and transport (16 February 2006*), framework nation (25 July 2002), comprehensive planning (3 November 2005), support for the host country during crisis management operations (15 June 2006), logistics support (*), reception, staging, onward movement and integration RSOM&I (20 September 2006*), battlegroups (5 October 2006), medical and health support (July 2007), maritime rapid response (15 November 2007), air rapid response (21 December 2007), military information (February 2008), military command and control (16 June 2008) and geospatial information (*). The updating of these concepts is set to continue throughout 2008. Several concepts (marked * above) were approved by the EU Military Committee in June 2008.

Future areas of action

While no new commitments of European troops are programmed, new areas are being watched closely by the Military Staff, as part of crisis anticipation: Middle East (particularly if a peace plan between Palestine and Israel materialises), Iraq (if US troops are pulled out), the former Soviet zone (Abkhazia-Georgia, for example; if Russian political tension eases) and Africa, the EU's "natural" area of operation, where there are numerous underlying conflicts.