Who will be the future president of the European Commission, its minister of foreign affairs, indeed the president of Europe, if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force on time? The field is open. The election of the new European parliament, on 7 June, marks a first step in renewing the EU institutions in the new 2009-2014legislative term.

The appointment of the future president of the European Commission is subject to two uncertainties and several conditions:

The first uncertainty is political. Whatever the procedure used (the Nice or Lisbon Treaty), the appointment of the Commission president is subject to the will of member states’ governments and, in one way or another (see below), the new European Parliament. The majority that emerges in the new assembly will depend as much on the result of the polls as the final composition of certain groups (EPP, Liberals and democrats, populist) and possible alliances (EPP-Liberals or Liberals-Socialists-Greens or EPP-Socialists). There is also instability for heads of state and government because of the economic crisis. Several governments have changed leaders in recent weeks (Czech Republic and Hungary) or could do so in upcoming elections (Belgium and Bulgaria in June, Germany in September, Czech Republic in October). Other governments are coming under scrutiny (Greece, Romania, United Kingdom).

The appointment must also strike a delicate balance with the other heads of the executive: politically (between Christian Democrats, Socialists, or even Liberals or Greens), governmentally (between large and small states) and geographically (between the South and North of Europe, or even between the East and the West). There are also unwritten conditions, such as the rule that the Commission president must be a high-ranking political leader (prime minister or former prime minister).

The second uncertainty is legal: the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will fundamentally change how the European Union’s executive institutional system is organised. It will introduce a new head next to the European Commission’s traditional president – the president of the European Council – and will establish the high representative for foreign policy as a key figure between two of its institutions. It will also combine, in a manner unrivalled in modern democracies, the executive power and the legislative power. Politically, it offers another way of balancing the power of the European Commission president and a possibility of compensation for member states that do not get this post.

But the introduction of a new treaty also creates another legal headache. Unless there is a surprise from the Irish, the Lisbon Treaty cannot enter into force before the new Commission is in place. The latter will therefore abide by the rules of the Nice Treaty, and in particular have fewer commissioners than the number of member states. The Lisbon Treaty allows an equivalent number to be maintained, at least until 2014 – and the rule can by changed by a European Council decision. There is one solution to avoid this reduction: the tacit extension of the Commission beyond its scheduled term. But this solution also has a drawback: it can only be for a limited time (a few weeks). The two other possible solutions: appointing a provisional Commission or a permanent Commission implies that at least one state ‘sacrifices’ its commissioner post in return for some sort of compensation. Unless a system of rotating posts is devised – which no member state is willing to do – then the compensation offered to a member state must be significant.

One of the most widely envisaged solutions ⁽¹⁾is that the country that has the post of high representative for foreign policy gives up its commissioner – while the treaty comes into force – and then becomes part of the Commission upon ratification.

Given this context, the combination of names that best meets all these criteria is: Barroso (Portuguese Christian Democrat) at the European Commission, Bildt (Swedish Conservative) as high representative – Sweden taking on its Presidency accepts temporarily foregoing its commissioner – and Gonzalez (Spanish Socialist) or Blair (British Labour) as president of Europe. All this would be accompanied by ‘compensations’ in terms of important commissioner posts for the states excluded from this triangle (France, Germany and Poland in particular).

But if one part of this ‘puzzle’ is missing, then this well-oiled mechanism seizes up. As recent history shows, the European Commission’s road is paved with ‘perfect combinations’ that fail at the last moment. With changing powers or candidates who pop up... all at the last minute.

⁽¹⁾ Another envisaged solution – possibly on top of the previous one – is that the state without a commissioner is responsible for the “secretary general” or the “legal service” at the heart of the Commission.