First and foremost, changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty will be felt in the negotiation of regulations. The next regulations on the Structural Funds will be negotiated via the ordinary legislative procedure, ie in co-decision with the European Parliament. Up until now, the general regulation on Structural Funds, which sets out the rules for Cohesion Policy and the general provisions for the different funds, has been adopted according to the assent procedure. MEPs could only accept or reject a draft regulation and not amend it. Informal contacts were of course set up with the Council of Ministers during the adoption procedure but, at the end of the day, the ministers were in charge of the process.

From now on, MEPs will be on the same footing as member states. That is quite a change. Who knows how the Structural Funds would be run today if MEPs had really had their say during the previous negotiations? At the time, the Parliament had battled hard, but in vain, to introduce sensitive innovations, such as the idea of a Community performance reserve to reward programmes that were working well or channelling unused funds to the regional policy budget and not to the EU’s general budget. It had often been an ally, but one lacking in clout, of the European Commission against a Council that was reluctant to accept changes. Only time will tell how it will manage its new powers in what is likely to be a tense relationship with the Council (the first test in this respect has not necessarily been conclusive – see box). Also, it will be important to see if member states will be tempted to short-circuit co-decision by having some decisions agreed by the European Council.

The new budgetary procedure introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will also give the Parliament more power during negotiations on the EU’s financial perspectives [medium-term budget] before regulations are agreed. The Parliament will have more influence than in the past in terms of how much money is allocated to different EU policies. And if they stick to their guns, MEPs are likely to at least look to keep the money earmarked for Cohesion Policy. To do so, they will in particular push forward the concept of ‘territorial cohesion’ introduced in the Lisbon Treaty as a general objective of the EU, alongside economic and social cohesion.

It is worth recalling that the Lisbon Treaty describes the regions to which Cohesion Policy will have to pay “particular attention” (Article 174.3) more precisely than before. Rural areas - areas “where industrial transition is taking place” - and regions that are suffering from serious and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, “such as the most Northern regions with very low population density and island, border and mountain regions,” are explicitly mentioned. These regions already enjoy special attention in the current Cohesion Policy. The explicit reference to them in the treaty gives this a more long-term prospect. Might this be an argument to put to those in favour of a Cohesion Policy reduced only to the poorest regions of the EU?

Finally, the new definition of the principle of subsidiarity in the Lisbon Treaty, which now refers to local and regional powers, may give a different kind of influence to the opinion of territorial authorities in the negotiation procedure for future regulations. Without prejudging what the Commission’s proposals will be and what member states will want to make of them, it is a safe bet to assume that the EU’s Committee of the Regions will be particularly attentive that the new texts do not transgress the principle of subsidiarity (in an extreme case, it can now even consider taking a case to the EU Court of Justice). It will also be important not to neglect the capacity for intervention that the new protocol on subsidiarity offers national parliaments and, where necessary, regional parliaments.

First test for Parliament

The European Parliament has already had a chance to exercise its new co-decision powers in Cohesion Policy. It happened a few months ago, when the regulation on Structural Funds was adapted to allow the regions to react to the economic and financial crisis. The new rules simplify access to funds, release additional money in 2010, in the form of an advance, for the member states that have suffered most from the crisis and soften the ‘N+2’ and ‘N+3’ rules, according to which funds allocated to a programme are lost if they are not used in the two (or three) years following the year they were approved.

What can be made of this first exercise in co-decision? Not a lot, really, as, from the first reading, the Parliament completely aligned itself with the Council’s position, which had nonetheless substantially amended the Commission’s initial proposal. Whether it had been assent or co-decision, nothing much would have changed. The proposal was stuck in Council for several months. Given that the aim was to make it easier to release money in the context of the crisis, the Parliament had no wish to be the one lengthening any delay. The text, even in its ‘Council version’, was expected by the regions. So the Parliament kept a low profile for a good cause.