Will the economic crisis have an impact on the future cohesion policy? Could we see the reappearance of a sort of ‘Objective 2’ designed to help regions that are being restructured?

No, Commissioner Hahn does not intend to go back to a system of ‘microzoning’, where one would identify small pieces of territories in which to intervene. We are staying along the lines of the 2007-2013 approach, which leaves the political decision making responsibly with states/regions, in partnership with the Commission, on how and where to use resources to resolve problems of competitiveness and employment. Where I think that the crisis could have an effect is in knowing if cohesion policy needs to have rapid intervention instruments at its disposal. That isn’t what it is meant for: cohesion policy is a structural policy, which works on the medium term. But the discussion has been started – and that is a novelty due to the crisis: do we need to add something which allows states to deal with crises in the short term? That is an ongoing discussion.

The Commission insists more than ever on the need to concentrate Structural Funds’ resources. States are theoretically in agreement but they tend to interpret the few guidelines that Brussels has been able to give them broadly…

That is going to be an important element in the proposal that the Commission is in the midst of developing. Today, resources are often distributed in lots of areas and, as a result, we don’t always manage to create critical mass. This makes the criticism about added value easier. So we are convinced that, far more than in the current period, the cohesion policy of the future will have to envisage mechanisms that force member states and regions to focus resources on some main areas, which will come from the EU’s 2020 strategy.

Will we start again with an ‘earmarking’ system?

‘Earmarking’ is useful but should be complemented by other instruments. The important thing, what really interests us, is not where the money goes but what one wants to do and what the objectives are in terms of results. We will have to have a negotiation with the states and regions on the objectives to be achieved – in the areas of jobs, innovation, etc, issues that tie in with the EU’s 2020 strategy – and a form of contract. They will have to make commitments and we will propose a monitoring system that will make it possible to say how the state or region is progressing towards its objectives. Resolving this issue about performance and results, and the mechanisms to deal with that, is essential. That is necessary to be able to organise the discussion on the added value of cohesion policy on solid bases. Otherwise, cohesion policy will always be open to criticism about its added value.

Does the performance indicators’ idea really have a chance of being accepted by member states?

The Commission must do its work and make a proposal. Afterwards, there will be negotiations and we’ll see. I think that the climate has changed a fair bit since the last negotiations, when, in terms of rigour in the content, not much of the initial Commission proposals was left. I have the feeling, especially because of the crisis, that there will be a slightly more demanding climate, in particular from net contributors, to identify mechanisms that ensure money is used efficiently. I’m talking about mechanisms that can prove how interventions have performed in terms of structural responses and economic and social improvement. In addition, the system of selecting objectives and defining indicators will be accompanied – and this is the other big part – by a much stronger conditionality than currently. The Commission decided that on 30 June with its communication on economic governance.

This communication talks about macroeconomic conditionality. Will that be all?

No, we envisage two types of conditionality. Macro-conditionality: where a state does not respect the Stability Pact, there will be penalties. Perhaps, it will be the suspension, perhaps the cancellation of funds. The discussion is still ongoing. But the future cohesion policy will also have to introduce structural and institutional conditionalities. One example: it’s pointless to invest in environmental infrastructure if EU environmental legislation is not transposed. The two will go together. This type of conditionality is directly linked to the efficiency of cohesion policy, contrary to macroeconomic conditionality.