“My mandate is very clear,” says French General Jean-Philippe Ganascia, force commander of the EUFOR Chad/CAR Mission, in an interview withEuropolitics .

What do you see as the main difficulty of this mission?

As commander of this force, the greatest difficulty for me is maintaining a proactive approach to our action and being operational right away even if all the logistics issues are not resolved. We have to secure intelligence, organise patrols and be visible everywhere.

Are the rebels hampering your operations?

They are not a threat. Whether they are corrupt soldiers, rebels or bandits, it makes no difference to me. It is not for me to make distinctions between uniforms or to enter into political considerations. My mandate is very clear. As soon as anyone poses a military threat to civilian populations, attacks NGOs, the MINURCAT [the UN Mission to Chad and the Central African Republic] or my men, I have to take action. As long as they continue on their way, I am not concerned.

The recent events in Ade demonstrated that there can be an influx of Chadian or rebel casualties to your posts. Will you intervene or not?

There is no question about it, we are impartial. But doctors are bound by their Hippocratic oath. Doing nothing would be a failure to assist a person in danger. If casualties are brought to us, it will be for the doctors to act in accordance with their own rules, to take vital measures to ensure survival and to stabilise the victims before evacuating them. But things stop there. There is no question of going out in search of wounded troops with medical aircraft.

If a threat occurs, do you have to await orders or is a ground unit autonomous?

The rules of engagement are very broad, giving us the possibility of using arms in the event of evidence of threat or an imminent threat to the objectives of our mission (population, NGOs, MINURCAT and EUFOR). We do not have to call three staff meetings before deciding to act. So each patrol has a certain degree of autonomy. The troops can react in proportion to the problem and report on their actions.

It is clear that your working conditions are not easy. How are the troops coping?

I am surprised to see that everyone is adjusting well. The Swedes and Finns, for example, who are not accustomed to African terrain, have set a good example of determination and aptitude to adapt. Generally speaking, there is real solidarity between the different troops. In certain international operations, when you switch from one sector to another, you practically need a visa. That is not the case here. People are proud to be here, enthusiastic, even those who come from countries that initially had misgivings.

At times there seems to be confusion in certain functions between the French EUFOR troops and fellow French troops engaged in Operation Sparrowhawk and the EFT (French Elements in Chad). Is this a source of problems?

France made the choice of assigning certain common resources to EUFOR and EFT. That was its choice. It was not what EUFOR requested. We simply requested resources.

Is EUFOR’s impact already noticeable on the ground? When will it be possible to say that it is a success?

It is too early for now. There will be a mid-term evaluation of the common action in September. All I know is that I would wait a long time before evaluating our impact on the ground. Because the return of displaced persons – which is one of our objectives – can be due to several reasons. At present, for example, we are seeing some returns, not isolated, possibly in excess of 1,000 people. But why are they returning? Is it to see whether their houses are alright or to move back in? Is it temporary or permanent? You have to be very cautious in these results.

The EUFOR mission will end on 15 March 2009, without prolongation. Is that inescapable?

Yes, our mission ends on 15 March. We have to accept the spirit of this mission, which is to serve as a relay for another international mission (UN-OAU). We mustn’t slip into a UN blue helmet mindset, where our presence is the essence of the action. In one year, we will probably not have settled the Darfur crisis, but we will have helped. At that time, there will need to be reflection on putting in place another mission with a different mandate, focused on certain specific actions. There is starting to be talk of border monitoring, for example. There is also a need for a real police force here. There might also be a need for a disarmament mission. Europe brings added value by engaging in this type of targeted mission.

General Ganascia’s biography is available at www.europolitics.info > Search > 224041