All diplomats and Europeans in the region are saying the same thing, namely that “there will be no solution without Russia,” explains a European diplomat. “Moscow is blowing hot and cold in the region. It is in its interests to maintain a presence and a nuisance force,” specifies another. Russia “is using the Transnistrian conflict to its best interests,” underlined a third diplomat. But, for the past few days at least, a new wind appears to have been blowing in the region.

On 11 April, in fact, the Presidents of Moldova, Vladimir Vorodin, and of Transnistria, Igor Smirnov – who had not met for almost seven years – agreed to a direct encounter in Bendery, a Transnistrian town, after having spoken via telephone. They agreed to reopen the ‘5+2’ negotiation process. Documents were exchanged. And the technical working groups – formed in October 2007 – were able to take shape. “The Moldovan President, Vorodin, who is on his last mandate [elections will take place in March 2009 – Ed], may want to be remembered in history as the man who reunified the country,” commented a diplomatic expert in Moldovan affairs.

“This meeting is likely to contribute to the resumption of negotiations on Transnistrian regulation according to the 5+2 formula,” commented Philippe Remler, head of the OSCE mission in Moldova. Moreover, the Finnish presidency of the OSCE has listed among its priorities the settlement of frozen conflicts, as recalled by Alexander Stubb, in Vienna, on 10 April during an OSCE Permanent Council session. Generally speaking, diplomats posted to the region appear to be cautious regarding the reopening of these negotiations.

International negotiations, with the mediation of Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, the United States and the European Union (known as 5+2), were suspended in February 2006. Following the introduction by the Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities of a new customs scheme for goods from Transnistria, Tiraspol [the capital] had stopped all contact with Chisinau, accusing it of an economic embargo. In a referendum organised the same year, 97.2% of the population opted for a reattachment to Russia.

It appears that this ‘détente’ is no more and no less the consequence of two parallel movements. On one hand, the rapprochement between Moldova and Russia, initiated in September 2007, was confirmed in the course of the months. The Moldovan President, Voronin, guaranteed in particular Moldova’s non-membership of NATO and acknowledged the immutability of Russia’s goods and assets in Transnistria – two primary conditions for Moscow. The symbolic high point of this ‘bon accord’ occurred during the debates in the Duma (Russian lower house), where some MEPs expressed their desire for “the Republic of Moldova to be a single state”. And the “first humanitarian train” of Russian grain arrived in Chisinau – via Tiraspol – on 19 March. On the other hand, Moscow is becoming increasingly irritated by Tiraspol. Firstly, from the economic point of view: its gas debts are in excess of one billion dollars. According to a Kremlin source, reported by the daily newspaper Kommersant, Transnistrians are operating a two-fold drainage of Russian pipelines: “firstly, they freely take our gas, then they sell it, but the money disappears”. As for the Transnistrian request to be recognised along similar lines as the Kosovan model, this was the last straw which angered the Kremlin. The Transnistrian ‘Foreign Affairs Minister’, Valeri Litskaï, was immediately summoned to the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry.

RUSSIAN BASES WILL REMAIN

Be that as it may, the Russians appear to have obtained the major assurance, which is one of the forces behind their position, of being able to keep their Russian bases in Transnistria, even in a possible reconstructed Moldova. This is a strategic necessity for Moscow. Without these bases, “the Russian forces would have to go back 700 kilometres,” explained an expert on the region and on defence issues. Whereas here, these troops – which belong to the XIV Army and whose basic role is to monitor the Balkans, and possibly be able to intervene – are within range of their target.

Leaders banned from the EU

According to a common Council position, which dates from 2003 and which has been regularly renewed since then (most recently on 25 February), some leaders from the “Transnistrian region” (Moldova), particularly its “President,” Igor Smirnov, his two sons Vladimir and Oleg, and several of the regime’s dignitaries (including ministers, the prosecutor and those in charge of the national customs service or the Transnistrian Bank) are forbidden to stay and travel within the European Union. But a development is possible. During an EU ambassadors’ meeting in Brussels, in February, an unpublished declaration was recorded in the minutes, at the request of Romania, explicitly stipulating that it is possible to “consider possible modifications to this list [...] if a member state or the European Commission requests it”. It should be noted that this travel ban does not affect member states bound by an obligation of international law (host country of an international organisation, of the OSCE or of an international conference convened by the United Nations). The decision of 25 February is available at www.europolitics.info > Search > 223772