'Military space' has until now been conspicuous by its absence from the debate on European defence. An absence that is easy to understand when one considers the meagre spatial capabilities of the majority of EU member states, including the largest, the concentration of industries in the space sector and the exorbitant cost of a military space policy. And yet this continued absence poses a serious threat to any ambitions of developing a true European defence system given the growing importance of 'spatial solutions' – ballistic missiles, satellites used for observation, listening, communication and probably attack – in the modern range of weapons available to armed forces.

And yet there is no getting away from the fact the Europe has mastered a wide range of spatial technologies, particularly with regard to boosters, satellites, including those used for defence purposes (Skynet, Syracuse, Helios, Cosmo-Skymed-Pleiades, Sar-Lupe) and telecommunications, and electronic control equipment.

Playing catch-up

Europe, today, is lagging far behind the United States and Russia and soon it will be faced by challenges from emerging countries such as China. Serge Plattard, former secretary-general of the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI), notes that Europe contributes only 4% of worldwide spending on "the military in space" - the equivalent of 0.4% of European defence budgets. Meanwhile, the United States contributes 90% of world spending on the military in space with an allocation of between 7% and 8% of defence credits. And there are plans to increase this by 30% by 2012 as part of the new National Space Policy launched by President George Bush in July 2006.

Most experts stress that only countries or groups of countries that can claim to be 'military space powers' will still carry sufficient weight, at the end of the current geopolitical reshuffle, to play a significant role on a planetary scale. Space, says the ESPI, is essential if it wants to achieve its "headline security goals". In other words, Europe is confronted with the need, obligation even, to seek a certain degree of independence in this strategic domain. Also with respect to NATO, without breaking the alliance referred to in the Lisbon Treaty: "Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those states which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation".

So, in this ambiguous context, Europe is being called on to firstly attribute a spatial dimension to a common defence project which is still to be defined and put into place, then it will be required to implement a coherent and binding strategy based on a global, accurate and long-term research and technological and industrial development programme. While it is true to say that certain discreet programmes do exist (Helios I and II, Cosmos-Skymed, etc), several other projects have been abandoned: the Horus radar observation satellite between France and Germany, the French-German-British cooperation in Syracuse III (telecommunications) and the withdrawal of first the United Kingdom then Germany from the Trimisatcom project.

And, as highlighted by a French parliamentary report, "the proliferation of European systems is good for turnover in the short term but is detrimental in the long term in terms of profitability and development perspectives" ⁽¹⁾.

Two levers: Duality and security

European citizens' demand for security could be one of the levers of a defence space policy. In a communication of 26 April 2007, the European Commission pointed out that "space assets can make a significant contribution to increasing the security of European citizens" and in another document on space policy, dated 23 May 2005, it noted that the "Council of the EU has recognised that space assets could contribute both to making the EU more capable in the field of crisis management and to fighting other security threats".

The civil-military duality would also appear to be a positive factor. In 2005, the Commission in a communication noted that "the differentiation between defence infrastructure and internal security infrastructure and systems is becoming blurred". Two years later, on 21 May 2007, the EU Council adopted a resolution recognising that "space technologies are often common between civilian and defence applications and that Europe can, in a user-driven approach, improve coordination between defence and civilian space programmes, pursuing in particular the synergies in the domain of security, whilst respecting the specific requirements of both sectors and the independent decision competences and financing schemes".

Nevertheless the most powerful lever will undoubtedly be political. The currently 'frozen' Lisbon Treaty would have provided the EU with the required legal base because for the first time, it includes an article (172bis) devoted to space policy and in Article 27 it stipulates that the EU intends to develop a common 'defence' as a way of ensuring "operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets". Meanwhile, until such time as the sector receives a real boost at the highest European level, two projects give cause for hope: Galileo, the future European satellite radio navigation system, whose military use is no longer considered a taboo subject, and Kopernikus, a second European satellite system used for surveillance of the environment and…. security.

⁽¹⁾ Report on the major programme areas of the future space policy - 7 February 2007.