The Georgian crisis has given a boost to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and visibility that it had not previously reached. For the first time in years, the theoretical model – often quoted in seminars and meetings on European defence – has become a reality. War has erupted in a territory close to the EU and other international organisations cannot intervene:

- The UN is paralysed by its intergovernmental operation, with Russia and the US at loggerheads and the Security Council system including a right of veto

- NATO is discredited by its almost belligerent status. Dominated by the US, the institution is very biased. And its intervention would not be considered an act that would calm things down but rather an act that would create additional tension

- Other regional organisations, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the Council of Europe, do not really have the resources for operational intervention.

That leaves the European Union. Its lack of unity in terms of foreign policy - so often criticised - may be an asset in this case. Of course, the differences in the positions of member states make the formation of a common political position more complex. But the diversity of views is also a guarantee of impartiality and creates a possibility for them to be involved. Furthermore, the EU has shown that it has some capacity to intervene: military (Chad), civil-military (Kosovo) and border surveillance (Moldova-Ukraine). As for its doctrine of peacekeeping missions defined in Petersberg, in the midst of the Yugoslav wars, it remains relevant. But this ESDP is still missing some elements in terms of capability, foreseeability and command in particular, in order to be entirely operational and dissuasive.

Suddenly, the priorities presented at the beginning of the French EU Presidency in terms of defence have become relevant:

- updating the European concept of security

- reinforcing the 'planning' and 'anticipation' function within the EU’s general army staff

- strengthening and diversifying the possibilities of intervention, both civil and military. With the military battle group, Europe only has one kind of rapid response to crises, which is not always appropriate (and has never been used). The EU must therefore reinforce its capacity to manage civil crises, its military maritime and air capabilities, and learn to pool together its operations. A need all the more important since national budgets are strongly tested with the financial crisis

- reinforcing technological and industrial potential. Developing the European defence industry is as much a guarantee of independence as of efficiency. By developing common models (eg planes, armoured tanks, transmissions), they are facilitating the 'interoperability' of armies, ie their capacity to work together. It is not, in fact, just a question of having the technical capacity to intervene but also of having a credible and dissuasive instrument at the political level.