Observers will undoubtedly have noted that the issue of the physical security of vital infrastructures in the energy sector is absent both in the conclusions of the European Council, held on 15-16 October in Brussels, and the road map on European energy security, which is annexed to them. However, as recently emphasised by the Dutch MP Jos van Gennip to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "attacks against vulnerable and poorly defended energy infrastructures are now regarded as perhaps the most effective means of directly impacting" not just importer countries but also producer countries and, via them, their energy customers.

The EU27's strategic supplies originate from and transit via a series of countries outside the European Union (EU), countries which do not always display all the guarantees in terms of political stability and immunity from terrorism-related risks. The following have thus been mentioned: the realisation of the 'Mediterranean electric ring', connections with new partners from South-East Europe (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and the UN Mission to Kosovo) united with the EU within the Energy Community, or even energy partnerships to be constructed with the countries in the Caspian Sea region and Africa. The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), accepted by the European Council on 17 December 2004, does not, moreover, ignore this external dimension. But it is also true that such an external strategy poses a string of questions associated with cooperation likely to be established with these third countries, from the possession of a suitable European military tool to the coordination of missions with NATO, which have not yet received a proper response.

However, the European Council could at least have referred to the protection of its own sensitive infrastructures. For all that, the Union has not remained indifferent, specifically via the EPCIP, to the physical security of its infrastructures for production (nuclear thermal power plants, dams, liquid gas plants), transport (gas pipelines, oil pipelines, high voltage lines, oil tankers, gas carriers) and energy storage. This preoccupation, which is expressed via the creation of 'contact points', groups of experts in 'critical infrastructures' (CI), is - among others - at the heart of the CI to be protected, a directive proposed by the European Commission, on 1 December 2006, which was the subject of a 'political agreement' between internal affairs ministers, on 5 June.

While the EPCIP tackles the protection of CIs via an 'all risks' approach, it is nevertheless the threat of terrorism which is considered to be a priority. The aim is not to create a unique instrument, since most EU states have already implemented, especially since 2001, a range of measures at national level. It is more a question of identifying potential targets, "when a need will have been listed following an analysis of failures in terms of security," and providing, when necessary, a European response. There is, in fact, no question of duplicating efforts already agreed at the level of states and regions. On the other hand, all the parties concerned - public authorities, competent authorities, as well as owners-operators of CIs – are supposed to be associated with the conception and implementation of these measures under the surveillance of the future Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN). This is a measure which, as underlined by the Commission in its proposal for a decision of 27 October creating CIWIN, will distinguish itself from the other rapid alert systems set up by the Union due to its 'intersectoral' nature.

For its part, the directive on which the EU27 agreed, on 5 June, defines the procedures necessary for the recording and classification of these CIs as well as a common approach for the evaluation of the need to improve their protection. It is from this perspective that, in 2007, the Commission launched - in the context of the 7th European Framework Programme for R&D - a pilot project, with a budget of €3 million, around six themes: strengthening of measures to protect critical infrastructures; weaknesses and capacity of resistance of critical infrastructures, and development of related methodologies; alleviation strategies and risk evaluation for critical infrastructures; development of emergency plans; development of common standards for security and innovative technologies for the protection of critical infrastructures; and transnational projects.