Surrounded by two oceans and four seas, Europe is a major maritime entity. It has a coast that is 70,000 kms long. This physical reality also has its demographic and economic implications as 40% of the European Union's population live in maritime regions and they generate 40% of the EU's GDP, whilst 90% of its external trade and 40% of its domestic trade come from maritime transport ⁽¹⁾.

These are the sorts of factors that make the security of maritime approaches and supply routes a major issue for the EU.

For a long time, Western countries considered non-military maritime threats (piracy, trafficking) as secondary phenomena that mainly took place far from their coasts. Although recurrent, acts of piracy in a region such as the Strait of Malacca were still sufficiently small scale in terms of volumes of maritime trade not to warrant more than a relatively small amount of attention. The same went for a possible terrorist attack against a ship or some maritime infrastructure. In Europe, only some countries that felt the most exposed had taken into account such a threat during the 1980s and 1990s.

It has taken the stimulus of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the development of an International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, followed by a regulatory and normative body of law more or less exported by the US, for maritime security to have full visibility within the EU's maritime policy. This visibility has become more marked as the increase in the threat posed by terrorism has come hand in hand with the massive increase in the problem of clandestine immigration as well as the need to fight illegal trafficking. Maritime states have therefore focused on improving the surveillance of their coastal approaches. The issue of how to coordinate efforts has quickly emerged. How can the maritime area along Europe's coast be covered? While the young European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), initially designed just for maritime safety, has finally added a security element to its mission, an ad hoc organisation is still yet to be established. The idea of a European coast guard is still being debated. Some countries point out the complexity of such a project, especially in terms of transfers of sovereignty.

This is the case for France, which relies on its model organised around maritime 'Préfets' [the state's representative in a department or region] and advocates interstate coordination based on points of contact coordinating the national actions of each of the agencies involved. This model of coordination and not standardisation in a single agency interests a number of countries. It is close to the solution chosen, for example by Spain, which has entrusted the Guardia Civil with this coordination.

Whatever type of organisation is chosen, the important thing is to base it on sufficient surveillance and intervention capacities. France has therefore reactivated its semaphores, of which radar, direction finders and automatic identification system (AIS) transponders are being gradually put in a network via the SPATIONAV system. This system makes it possible to consolidate and share information on maritime approaches.

For its part, Spain has deployed the SIVE surveillance system, while numerous other European countries have also undertaken the modernisation of their coastal surveillance by deploying integrated systems (vessel traffic management and information systems – VTMIS). All the systems together will be complemented through the implementation of the long-range identification tracking (LRIT) system, on 31 December 2008.

Cooperation programmes can be added to these national initiatives. Developed as part of the 6th Framework Programme for Research and Development, the EU research programme MarNIS (Maritime Navigation and Information Services) aims to develop integrated technologies and systems for the detection and fusion of maritime information. The programme, which has a budget of €19.2 million, started in 2005 and will coordinate 47 European companies until 2009. For its part, EMSA will ensure that the LRIT data are centralised and distributed to all the member states. The Kopernikus (ex-GMES) programme also includes a maritime surveillance element (MARISS).

But protection of European maritime approaches will not be enough, not just because the fact that the sea is a continuum implies the need to take into account dangers and threats from far away, but also because this threat hangs over free movement on the high seas and therefore over the EU's supplies. The huge increase in the number of acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia has thus forced European countries to decide on a joint action. The EU Nav operation aims to deploy a naval intervention force by 10 December at the latest. The European force's mission will be to protect ships transporting humanitarian aid for the World Food Programme, ships regarded as 'particularly vulnerable' or sensitive, and to put in place all the arrangements to try to deter and stamp out any act of piracy in the area. Although the mission is not without difficulties, both in terms of force generation and the definition of its legal framework, it does, however, show how European security and defence has moved forward. The operation is of course part of Europe's contribution to global stability but it is also an act affirming its strength. By deploying at the intersection of maritime routes that are critical for its autonomy, Europe is showing its ambition to protect its interests well beyond its borders.

(*) Luc Viellard (lviellard@ceis-strat.com) is head of the Strategic Forecasting Department of CEIS, the European Company for Strategic Intelligence

 

⁽¹⁾ 'An integrated maritime policy for the European Union’, a communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - COM(2007) 575 final – 10/10/2007.