Were operational restrictions responsible for the disputes between the US Air Force (USAF) and the US Army on the subject of the use of MALE drone systems ⁽¹⁾? That's what the two entities concerned are trying to prove in the work now being carried out to reach an agreement on their common usage. It is also the reason it is in the interest of EU member states to launch their own reflection on the subject, failing which they might have to accept having American concepts of employment, regulation and equipment imposed. The USAF previously tried to assume control of drones flying at more than 1,000 metres, a position which it justified by its unique experience of the third dimension and its status as the number one MALE and HALE ⁽²⁾. operator. It also emphasised its need to guarantee the safety of its piloted aircrafts. The US Army defended its interest in drones on the grounds that it needs to be able to respond rapidly to demands from its forces for contact and to deal with fleeting targets. With the advent of the programme ⁽³⁾ this need was transformed into acquisition. Today, the aim of the USAF and the US Army is no longer to establish a single fleet of drones but rather to establish procedures authorising their transfer from one entity to the other depending on the urgency of the mission, and irrespective of the geographical limitations.

There is little doubt that finances played a part in prompting this quest for interoperability. While drones no longer hold the same importance for the two entities, they are expecting to have to make a choice between their respective equipment programmes. The USAF is interested in information systems and would be prepared to drop the third dimension for the fourth. It is also involved in costly acquisitions ⁽⁴⁾.

The need for interoperability between the American forces is in line with the logic of the 'Tsahal reflections' ⁽⁵⁾. As a way of limiting the effects of 'war fog', certain ground officers from the Israeli army have requested access to the capabilities of the MALE systems operated by the air forces.

The drones which allow for the OODA (observation, orientation, decision and action) cycle to be short-circuited and provide a response to new threats need to be integrated with the other equipment operating in networks. In Israel, the 'drone-combat helicopter' combination has been operational since 2004 and used for the rapid identification and treatment of Palestinian targets ⁽⁶⁾.

In Iraq, the drones' ability to remain 'in the zone' and to sustain different charges (captors and armaments) puts added pressure on the enemy, which would normally have better knowledge of the ground and the element of surprise on its side. The drones help determine the pace of operations: their presence and ability to inform and attack at any given moment provides a response to the permanent insecurity ⁽⁷⁾ created by the enemy.

In addition to common procedures, interoperability also needs to be technically possible. This is no easy task and there are many difficulties to overcome. Air traffic aside, the drones need to be integrated into a digitalised battle field and an electromagnetic spectrum which is so cluttered that there is a risk of an increasing amount of involuntary fog ⁽⁸⁾ and available bandwidths are becoming increasingly rare.

In addition, the American forces have to take into account the multinational character of operational theatres. The key is to find solutions with allies without compromising the effectiveness of the operations. The current situation where interoperability and integration are considered almost as one is unsustainable. The British, operating MALE drones from the United States, could potentially aspire to accomplishing sovereign missions ⁽⁹⁾ from their own territory without recourse to American resources.

In Afghanistan, the French armed forces, as was the case with the American forces, will undoubtedly encounter difficulties in using their own systems. Despite this, the experience gained would allow France to maintain its operational credibility and to carry some weight in drafting the rules on the use of drones.

Finally, if interoperability with the United States, via NATO, is unavoidable, it must not result in EU military capacities being integrated into the American system of command and control, unless European countries endorse an 'auxiliary' rather than 'partner' status. Drones offer the opportunity to consolidate an autonomous 'Europe of defence' that needs to be seized without wasting any time.

(*) Bertrand Slaski (bslaski@ceis-strat.com) is a consultant at CEIS, the European Company for Strategic Intelligence.

⁽¹⁾ MALE: Medium altitude, long endurance. For the United States, these are drones from the General Atomics Predator family.
⁽²⁾ HALE: High altitude, long endurance. These are drones from the (Northrop Grumman) Global Hawk family
⁽³⁾ An armed drone derived from the Predator and presented as a 'hunter-killer'.
⁽⁴⁾ These combat aeroplanes are the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) and the Raptor (F-22).
⁽⁵⁾ These reflections were launched after the operations against the Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006.
⁽⁶⁾ In 2006, Hermes 450 and Searcher II drones supposedly transferred data in real time to combat F-15 and F-16 aircraft as well as Apache helicopters.
⁽⁷⁾ This insecurity is characterised by suicide attacks and spontaneously concocted explosives.
⁽⁸⁾ In Iraq, for example, small American (ScanEagle) and British (Desert Hawk) drones suffered interference from the Iraqi civil communication network.
⁽⁹⁾ Anti-terrorist operations, the fight against trafficking, identity protection, information acquisition.