For the European Union, the lack of a clear and coordinated common strategy in the area of drones raises several questions about the continent’s aeronautical and military ambitions.

The use of drones in operations’ theatres is growing fast. It is leading armed forces to quickly develop their concepts of use. Drones, which were initially intended for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, have lots of potential operational uses, which it would be worth further exploring. That is particularly the case for MALE (Moyenne Altitude Longue Endurance, or Average Altitude Long Endurance in English) drones.

These drones cover considerable distances (over 1,000 kilometres), operate for significant periods of time (over ten hours in an area) and, above all, carry out more and more varied tasks. By way of example in a non-exhaustive list, all these on-board systems and sensors serve to provide information to decision makers, images to commanders and troops on the ground as well as to point out objectives for aircraft, relay communications for units far from their base and to deliver weapons.

This ability of the MALE drones to offer different services to several players at the same time sometimes leads observers to draw hasty or erroneous conclusions. Two examples can be pointed to: on the one hand, the supposed substitutability of drones and manned aircraft and satellites and, on the other, the deceptive similarity between armed drones (UAS or Unmanned Aircraft Systems) and combat drones (Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems, or UCAS).

The first point is one that we can deal with succinctly. MALE drones are not intended to replace other systems. Instead, they bring new and complementary capacities to existing equipment, including the possibility to ‘stay’ over an area and transmit data in real time to far away places thanks to a satellite link.

Comparisons are not enough. It is important to note that the appearance of firearms did not lead to the disappearance of arms with blades, that artillery did not replace the pistol or the gun, that the emergence of combat tanks did not lead to the withdrawal of howitzers, etc. Of course, the MALE drones versus manned aircraft and satellite issue follows the same logic.

The second example needs special consideration, given its implications. Thus, the capacity for MALE drones to carry weaponry does not necessarily make them combat drones (UCAS). To convince oneself of that, just look at the US, the country with the largest operational fleet of drones in the world and the highest number of technological projects in this area.

Currently, US forces mainly arm drones from the Predator family (eg Predator B and Sky Warrior) from General Atomics. Predator B has, for example, the same transport capacity as an A10 (the famous ‘tank killer’) combat plane. The idea of arming these vehicles comes from their responsiveness. During a planned mission, they can be rerouted in an ‘opportune’ manner to deliver armaments to an identified target by an operator or to support ground forces calling for covering fire.

As for the UCAS, no system is totally operational today. The US Navy has launched a programme (UCAS Demonstrator) through Northrop Grumman. The first flight of the X-47B demonstrator is due to take place at the end of 2009 but no mass production date has been announced. For their part, Boeing ⁽¹⁾ and Lockheed Martin are positioning themselves to win future calls for tender, possibly to replace capacity offered by the B-2A Spirit, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

In Europe this time, with the demonstrator programme nEUROn, an industrial team led by Dassault enables participating countries to evaluate the interest of this kind of vehicle given the maturity of available technologies. In the future, this project may lead to the emergence of a European programme in the area of manned or unmanned new generation combat platforms.

In this context, and although one can understand the urgency of operational needs and although the capacity consequences of delays in developments of some industrial players cannot be overlooked, one can only be concerned about the purchase of US or Israeli drones by EU countries.

In the short term, these foreign alternatives clearly pose a threat to the emergence of a European programme of MALE ISR drones. In the longer term, these acquisitions may have a major impact on the interest of EU armed forces in a European combat drone. The paradoxical situation is that, having not supported the old continent’s efforts at achieving strategic autonomy, operational users may deem the technological expertise of European defence groups in the area of drones to be insufficient…

Although UCASs are not yet operational, there is one strong conclusion that emerges. The prototypes and work presented show up considerable differences with the UASs on which armaments are mounted.

First off, the fuselage of the UCASs – let’s take the example of the X-47B or the nEUROn – looks like a flying wing. This choice of design is to allow the drone to be stealthy, an essential characteristic given the missions that it will have to carry out in hostile terrain. It will allow it to offer little to enemy radar systems and therefore create the element of surprise. The combat drone will have to enter above a theatre first to neutralise the enemy defence systems. Once it has done this, it will be equipped with a high performance engine to carry out manoeuvres to avoid hostile fire. Finally, it will have to have a large amount of cognitive autonomy as it will need to bring together what the pilot sees and his/her analysis of the situation. This is a difficult point given the technological progress that has been carried out for the time being in the area of artificial intelligence.

For their part, MALE drones, whose external shape is similar to that of ‘traditional’ manned planes, operate in secure airspaces. Contrary to the UCASs, they need the virtually permanent presence of operators to analyse data collated in real time by their sensors, which implies a continuous link between the air vehicle and the command station.

A strong point is that the MALE drones can also do things for different actors, be that for customs by observing the illegal entry of goods onto national territory, for insurers by evaluating the damage caused by a natural disaster, or for transport companies by allowing optimal traffic management. In the end, armament is only one of the optional configurations of the platform.

In the US, Predators already take part in operations to fight fires and to monitor storms. Other drones are used to monitor land borders and to take readings as part of scientific missions.

We could say that MALE ISR drones are in essence intended for varied ‘interministerial’ security missions. On the other hand, combat drones, real war weapons, are intended for high intensity operations. So you cannot in any case confuse the two systems. Both have equal importance but have very different advantages ⁽²⁾.

For the European Union, the lack of a clear and coordinated common strategy in the area of drones - UASs and UCASs - raises several questions about the continent’s aeronautical and military ambitions.

Drone programmes are leading to crucial developments for the aeronautics of tomorrow (robotisation, propulsion, data transmission, miniaturisation of sensors, innovating materials). Without an effort in these areas, the long-term health of Europe’s aeronautical industry is not assured. Emerging countries may rapidly fill the technological gap between them and the best European groups, with consequences for jobs in Europe. The threat is all the more serious in that technologies developed by aeronautical research departments are used by other sectors (eg those relating to automobiles and medicine).

Finally, the EU’s operational credibility, and in particular its autonomy of action, could be called into question if its capacity to enter a theatre first would have to depend on a foreign country (the US). That is why it is worth working straight away on designing a solution – possibly a combat drone – that can deal with the development of the ground-to-air threat and anti-air defence systems or risk transforming Europe’s military capacity into an auxiliary of a more powerful partner.

(*) Bertrand Slaski (bslaski@ceis.eu) is a consultant in CEIS’s Strategic Forecasting Department

A first version of this article was published in the DSI’s special edition N°6 during Le Bourget 2009

⁽¹⁾ Boeing recently announced the launch, from its own funds, of a programme for a technology demonstrator called Phantom Ray. The company will use its X-45C prototype as well as developments achieved in the J-UCAS programme that it has abandoned.
⁽²⁾ The latest drone from the Predator family, the Avenger (Predator C) continues to be an armed drone despite efforts made by industry on its level of stealth and its engine.