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EUROPOLITICS / Climate - Copenhagen 2009Print this article | Print this article

Key negotiating points

By Anne Eckstein | Monday 07 December 2009

To keep global warming under 2°C – a threshold already considered too high by the scientists of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) – global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) should peak as soon as possible, certainly no later than 2020, and the international community should reduce its emissions by at least 50% from 1990 levels by 2050. For industrialised countries, this means reducing emissions by 25-40% from 1990 levels by 2020 and then by 80-95% from 1990 levels by 2050. Developing countries (LDCs) will have to contribute to this effort according to their means, which for the emerging economies should take the form of slowing the increase in emissions by 15 to 30% compared to present trends by 2020, and for all LDCs, a substantial slowdown in emissions increases compared to current trends by 2050.

NORTH-SOUTH DIVERGENCES

At this stage, the industrialised countries, represented by the G8 (summit in Aquila, Italy, in July 2009), agree only on a long-term guidance target or “common vision”: a 50% reduction of emissions by 2050. For the short term, the EU and Japan are relatively determined (but make their commitment conditional on a “comparable” effort by other countries), the United States, which has come a long way, remains well below its possibilities and the big emerging countries – China, India and Brazil – whose rapid development in the last decade has caused emissions levels to explode, are opposed to any binding commitment or target figures. Yet only legally binding objectives agreed internationally will prompt the parties to make the effort needed. Many still balk at embarking on such a process and while the majority of the main players are advancing commitment proposals (see table), their promises, at this stage, do not add up to enough to reduce emissions at global level by more than 17% to 23%, far from the required minimum.

KYOTO MECHANISMS

The protocol had foreseen the introduction of a number of mechanisms to help the countries achieve their targets. The first is the global carbon market based on the ‘cap and trade’ principle. The EU was reluctant at the outset but ended up being the first to put such a mechanism in place. Other countries – Japan, Australia, China (with the aid of the United Nations) and even the United States (debate under way in Senate) – intend or have announced their intention do to the same. The aim is to set up an international and interconnectable market that covers at least all OECD countries.

Next come the so-called ‘flexible’ mechanisms: the CDM or Clean Development Mechanism (countries and/or enterprises from industrialised countries that invest in ‘green’ technologies in the LDCs receive carbon credits in exchange) and Joint Implementation (JI, whose principle is identical to CDM but between industrialised countries and more specifically concerning the transition economies). The CDM has been very successful. According to the UN, it encompassed 4,237 projects in 2008, of which 3,240 in Asia (1,557 projects in China and 1,135 in India) and 87 in Africa. Its success nevertheless does not mask the shortcomings of the system, for which a complete overhaul (eligibility criteria, functioning, management, refocusing) is on the conference agenda.

TIME BOMB

Surplus quotas are a ‘banana skin’ under the feet of those in charge of negotiating the post-2012 arrangements. In order to convince the greatst possible number of countries to participate, large quantities of carbon credits or emission rights (AAU or assigned amount units) were allocated to certain countries in advance. Under the protocol, these AAUs may be accumulated and transferred from one commitment period to another. The main beneficiaries of this measure are Russia, Ukraine and the Central and Eastern European countries (which were not yet in the EU). Given the collapse in their economy between 1997 and today, they have achieved significant emissions reductions “without effort” and especially without having to tap into their reserve of AAUs to keep their businesses running. Russia alone is said to have a reserve of no less than eight billion gigatonnes of CO 2 equivalent and the EU, through its new Eastern member states, some three billion GT equivalent of CO 2. If these quotas were to flood the market, the price of a tonne of CO 2 would collapse, dealing a fatal blow to the carbon market. Such a scenario is to be avoided at all costs, according to the EU and other countries that are now counting on such a market. Yet no one is willing to give up this capital without a fight. It remains to be seen who will be the first (Russia?) to light the fuse of what appears to be a time bomb for Copenhagen.

Only legally binding objectives agreed internationally will prompt the parties to make the effort needed

Proposed emissions reductions by 2020 (from 1990 levels)

Industrialised countries

EU: -20% to -30% (if other industrialised countries make a comparable effort)

United States: -4% to -7% (or 17% by 2020, 30% by 2025 and 42% by 2030 over 2005 levels)

Japan: -25%

Canada: - 3%

Russia: -20% to -25% (announced at the EU-Russia summit on 19 November)

Norway: -40%

Switzerland: -20% to - 30%

Emerging countries

South Korea: -4% (over 2005)

Brazil: -36.1% to -38.9% (but Brasilia gives no base year, 2005 or 1990)

China: -40% to -45% cut in intensity of carbon emissions per unit of GDP compared with 2005 level

Indonesia: -26% (or -41% with international support), but no base year given

India, South Africa: refuse to announce a binding figure, including for an emissions ceiling.



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