One of the first visits by the EU’s new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, will be to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The choice mirrors the Union’s concerns. Unlike its neighbours - which are moving in the direction of EU membership, albeit at very different rates - Bosnia is stagnating and the outlook for accession over the longer term is not solid enough to encourage the political leaders of the three communities (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, also known as Bosnian Muslims)  to work out their fundamental differences over the country’s future.

Bosnia has been dealt a few hard blows in recent months, however. The country did not get visa exemption offered by the EU to Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro on 19 December 2009; it was also clearly told that in the absence of a constitutional reform, EU membership was out of the question; and in early December last year, NATO turned down its membership action plan, while approving Montenegro’s. “Political leaders now know the price of their failure to take action,” sums up Dimitris Kourkoulas, head of the Commission delegation.

The visa decision, a huge disappointment to the population, nevertheless started the ball rolling. The first biometric passports were issued in November and the country’s parliament adopted an anti-corruption law (corruption is one of Bosnia’s major problems) in mid-December. These measures are two of the criteria required for the visa waiver, which may become possible by summer 2010.

AGGRESSIVE POLITICAL CLIMATE

Fourteen years after the Dayton peace agreements, Bosnia is going through a bizarre period. In spite of the worsening of the economy (Bosnia has one of the lowest standards of living in Europe and the rate of unemployment reaches 40%), the security situation is calm and a resumption of hostilities seems out of the question for almost everyone. The EU’s military mission - EUFOR Althea, which has already been cut back to 2,000 men – is marking time, waiting for a decision by the member states on its transformation into a small assistance mission for the Bosnian army. Sarajevo gives the impression of being a relatively calm European city of 400,000 inhabitants.

This appearance of normality stands in contrast with a political climate dominated by the aggressive rhetoric of the majority nationalist parties (Serbian SNSD, Bosniak SDA and Croatian HDZ-BiH), whose positions are still irreconcilable. On one side, the entity of the Orthodox Serbs, Republika Sprska (RS, 49% of the territory, see map), is still firmly opposed to strengthening of the central state. On the other, the ‘Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ the Bosniak-Croat entity, is still divided between Bosnian Muslims, who seek a stronger state, and Catholic Croats, some of whom still dream of their own third entity.

As a result of these political tensions, the international community has postponed from one quarter to the next putting an end to its supervision of the country, exercised by the High Representative, Austrian national Valentin Inzko, since spring 2009. He has coercive powers to impose laws or sack civil servants, for example.

POLITICAL REFORMS AT STANDSTILL

The Dayton agreements put an end to the war that raged from 1992 to 1995 (leaving in its wake more than 100,000 fatalities and 2.2 million displaced persons out of a population of four million) but left the country’s divisions intact. Progress was made on strengthening the central state up until 2006. The armies of the two entities were unified and the management of indirect taxes transferred. Since then, however, the country has stagnated under the influence of the nationalist parties, which gained strength in the local elections in 2008. The reforms promised in exchange for signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in spring 2008 are at a total standstill.

“When we look at the cumulative result of politics over the last three years, we find tens of thousands of jobs lost, hundreds of millions of euro worth of foreign and domestic investment lost, and poverty on the increase all across the country [...] In other democracies, governments that produce results like this are not re-elected,” deplored recently Deputy High Representative Raffi Gregorian (US).

A telling example that may cost the country dearly is the absence of agreement on taking a census, which is crucial for receiving EU aid. The last census, taken in 1991 before the war, showed 43.5% Bosniaks, 31.2% Serbs and 17.4% Croats. Although it no longer reflects the current situation, no one wants another census, some fearing the loss of past gains and others seeing it as legitimising a genocide. Yet the Commission wishes to organise a general census, in 2011, on the same day in all the Balkan states.

SERBS OPPOSE STRONGER CENTRAL STATE

The Bosnian Serbs are primarily responsible for the current stalemate. Satisfied with the status quo, they regularly use the right of veto enjoyed by each entity to prevent any reinforcement of the central institutions. In their defence, the RS, the centralised entity, functions much more effectively than the Bosniak-Croat Federation, which is divided into ten cantons (each having its own government and police force) and is generally considered “a real mess”.

The Europeans and Americans are keeping an eye on the Prime Minister of RS, Milorad Dodik, who holds the political and financial reins. He makes provocative declarations and regularly brandishes the threat of the secession of the RS. Dodik is also demanding the dissolution of the federal judicial bodies, especially since he has come under investigation for corruption. The leaders of the other communities are hardly more accommodating, however. “It’s easy to single out Dodik as the only one responsible for the tensions,” admits one diplomat.

Meanwhile, it is hard to imagine this “semi-protectorate in a semi-state of functioning,” to quote Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, starting up negotiations with the EU or even applying the Community acquisuniformly throughout its territory.

US AND EU PRESSURE

The EU and the United States are obviously concerned about this stalemate. Last October, Bildt and Under-Secretary of State James Steinberg convened the leaders of the three communities and proposed minimal constitutional reforms aimed at facilitating the country’s rapprochement with the EU and NATO.

The proposals focus on strengthening the central institutions (president, prime minister and parliament) and amending Bosnia’s electoral law, condemned by the European Court of Human Rights. At present, only one member of the three constituent peoples (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks) can be elected to the presidency or the upper house, which excludes the other communities (Albanians, Jews, Roma) and those who claim simply to be inhabitants of Bosnia.

This intense diplomatic effort (Steinberg made three trips to the area in two months) ended in failure, however. It is not likely to be renewed in 2010 since general elections will be held in October. “This initiative at least identified the areas where constitutional reform is needed to allow Bosnia to take its first steps towards membership. It also showed that the EU and the United States are on the same line,” observed Kourkoulas. On the Bosnian side, more is expected from the United States, especially since the return to power of officials from the Clinton era, than from the EU, whose credibility is still suffering from its passivity during the war.

CLOSING HR’S OFFICE OR NOT

It also shows, however, that “decisions can no longer be imposed from the outside,” observed one diplomat. Under these circumstances, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which brings together 55 countries and international organisations, is going to have to decide at its next meeting in February whether to close the Office of the High Representative or to put off the decision once more.

The closure is linked to certain conditions that have not yet been met (the most important being an agreement on the division of the state’s assets between the entities) but also to the fact that the “political situation is stable”. The Europeans would like to see it closed as soon as possible because, according to diplomats, “the high representative is part of the problem today”. The function is increasingly challenged. The Europeans themselves weakened it by seeking more limited use of the coercive powers, which consequently became less credible.

The latest illustration of this state of affairs is the rejection by the RS parliament of a decision taken by Inzko, on 14 December, to extend, until the end of 2012, the mandates of the international prosecutors and judges who are investigating war crimes. Challenges also came from Mostar, the large Southern city divided between Croats and Bosniaks, where the Croats were infuriated over another decision by Inzko. It concerned a change in the way of electing the municipal council and was taken after 17 (!) failures to elect a mayor since October 2008. The decisions have been implemented all the same, but the fact is that the high representative has become a punching ball in the complex Bosnian political arena.

The Europeans therefore wish to see local political leaders take on their responsibilities, which now also seems to be the position of the Americans. Another option could be more direct intervention in the country’s affairs, as defended by the former High Representative, the charismatic Paddy Ashdown. In an opinion column published on 30 December with William Hague (possible foreign minister in a future Conservative UK government), he urges the international community to “threaten to sanction politicians who undermine the Bosnian state” (a clear reference to Dodik) and not to close the High Representative’s Office until the constitutional reforms have been completed.

CARROT NOT TEMPTING ENOUGH

The closing of the HR’s office would not put an end to the international community’s commitment. Inzko would stay on as the EU’s special representative (a position he already holds) heading a reinforced mission and probably with powers of arbitration or remedy. EU membership is also still the long-term objective.

In fact, the EU, which is accustomed to the success of its ‘carrot and stick’ policy of conditionality for enlargement, is faced with an unprecedented situation and is caught up in a vicious circle. “Since membership is not on the immediate agenda, our carrot is not tempting enough to prompt reforms. Yet if they don’t take certain steps, membership cannot be considered,” summed up a diplomat. “The problem is that we see no alternative emerging to the nationalist parties, which play on people’s fears. A new generation of politicians is needed.”

For Kourkoulas, “it remains to be demonstrated that the EU’s power of attraction is capable of overcoming an ethnic conflict. There hasn’t really been a reconciliation here. We have to be patient and persistent. We have no other solution”. There remains the hope of Bosnia being swept along by the regional effect. “When they see all their neighbours moving closer to the EU, political pressure will lead to the compromises needed at domestic level,” hopes Bildt.

“It remains to be demonstrated that the EU’s power of attraction is capable of overcoming an ethnic conflict”