The European Union’s first naval military operation, responsible for combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden, has reached its cruising speed. What looked like being rather a challenge just a few months ago - having European Union warships guarding a part of the world that is more than 5,000 kilometres from Brussels, out of its ‘usual’ area – has become a reality. Operation Atalanta, or EUNAVFOR, depending on the title used, is only halfway through its mandate, but initial lessons can be learnt and possibilities can be identified for going forward.

SIGNIFICANCE

Being the EU’s first naval operation is in itself an innovation. Those who thought up the idea of Europe of defence probably had not thought, ten years ago, that the EU would be able to deploy and lead, without outside help (in particular from America), a maritime operation several thousand kilometres away from European coasts. Granted, the Western European Union (WEU), the forerunner to the ESDP, led maritime operations during the Gulf war and off the coast of Yugoslavia (see box). But the context was different; it was more a matter of coordinating the commitment of resources.

This operation is most importantly the Union’s first international policing operation. One of the officially stated goals is to protect European economic interests, in other words merchant shipping, and protect one of Europe’s (and the world’s) main supply routes for oil, gas, minerals and various goods. It is also to protect the specific interests of fishermen, particularly in Spain and France, who have a strong presence around the Seychelles.

This is quite a way from the objectives set out in Petersberg, almost 20 years ago, which were essentially aimed at peacekeeping or intervening between two forces, and a lot closer to the new European security strategy that aims to combat a wide range of threats. It is quietly creeping towards the ‘principle of action’ of any power or the ‘solidarity clause’ in the Lisbon Treaty. This can be viewed in a positive or negative light, but it cannot be ignored. Those who are calling for a stronger European defence must not be misunderstood. At the end of this mission, a threshold will have been crossed, both in terms of military as well as political capability. In this way, Atalanta perfectly achieves the goal written in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union, to “assert its identity on the international scene”.

In a highly strategic area, Atalanta demonstrates the EU’s capability as a ‘global’ force, a structure that is both military and civilian, political and legal. Although no official will openly admit it, the EU has ‘overtaken’ the Americans and NATO. The latter had had a presence in the area since 2002, under the operation Enduring Freedom, and were already involved in the anti-piracy fight, but without being equipped with a specific force. As a result, the EUNAVFOR operation has had a knock-on effect, with the Americans creating a new force, the CTF151, specifically dedicated to the fight against piracy and bringing together American ships (which have links with the Turks).

STRUCTURED OPERATION

Operation Atalanta is the only really structured anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden (and in the Indian Ocean). Unlike the other forces in the area, the European force is there permanently, has a structured command, with organised links to maritime industry (MSCHOA), legal agreements with third countries that benefit all participants (including non-EU members), and enjoys onshore logistical support in Djibouti, thanks to the permanent French base there. Atalanta is one of the only operations, among recent military operations by the European Union, and even the UN, where capabilities are not a crucial problem. “Although the head of an operation always wants more resources, we can say that we have the necessary resources,” confided Phil Jones, head of the operation when it started. And, indeed, the turnaround of boats is carried out smoothly. If needed, member state ships passing through the region, be they national or under the Atlantic alliance, provide occasional reinforcement or a transition between two shifts.

HESITANCE

While Spain and France, made aware of the situation very early on because of pirate attacks on their boats (fishermen, leisure boats), quickly pushed for a European naval operation, many countries were more hesitant (United Kingdom and Italy in particular) for different reasons (economic and/or political). As a result, the operation almost did not see the light of day. Some countries would have preferred to have seen NATO lead the operation. For many months, the two organisations (the European Union and NATO) prepared, in parallel, two operations. In October, during the Budapest summit, the alliance was still intending to launch a generation of forces to launch its operation.

At the United Nations, a vote on two successive resolutions, on 15 May and 2 June (1814 and 1816), made it legal to use an international operation by appealing to member states. The first request to members was to ensure the safe passage of boats from the World Food Programme (WFP). The second authorised the use of force (Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter) against acts of piracy and to enter into Somali waters simply by notifying the Somali transitional government.

At the same time, preparations for an operation were picking up pace at a European level. The Council of foreign affairs and defence ministers approved the principle of an operation, on 26 May, and insisted on the need for a wider participation from the international community in these escorts. But the delicate question of the legal framework for the operation (in particular the procedure of arrest and transfer of pirates) complicated discussions. And the 27 still did not manage to agree on the details of the operation. On the agenda for the foreign affairs ministers’ meeting, on 22 July, the 27 member states acknowledge that the file is not yet ready. On 5 August 2008, the concept of crisis management is approved (by written procedure). But the crisis in Georgia that occurs a few days later rallies minds and diplomats in the weeks that follow.

For want of anything better, on 15 September 2008, the Council decided to set up a coordination unit (EUNAVCO) “to support surveillance and protection operations”. The unit’s joint action is immediately approved, on 19 September.

But the pirates do not stop. Blow by blow in September, they turn to different prey: a pleasure sailing boat (the Carré d’As), an oil tanker (the Front Voyager) and above all a Ukrainian ship (the Faina), carrying tanks and rocket launcher weapons to Africa (Kenya or South Sudan depending on the source). The need for action is felt.

It is in fact the ship owners – in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany - who sweep away the final doubts. The weight of Lloyd and British ship owners, in particular, works in favour of the European operation. When Libby Purves, one of the editors at the Times, published a pamphlet accusing the government of inaction, the die was cast. “Our islands lie more open to blackmail and danger than at any other moment since Henry VIII,” she said.

A few days later, London officially endorsed the European operation. But not without something in return. The operation would be managed from the Northwood headquarters (near London) and led by a Brit, Rear-Admiral Jones is considered likely. The operational planning could at last really get going.

At an international level, the 7 October vote on a new UN resolution paved the way for an EU operation since the Security Council welcomed “the ongoing planning process towards a possible European Union naval operation”. On 10 November 2008, the Council approved the joint action to launch Operation Atalanta. The operation was officially launched on 8 December 2008, during the Council of foreign affairs ministers. Its mandate is one year.

WEU’s naval history

In 1987 and 1988, Western European Union member states decided to respond to the threat posed to the freedom of navigation by mining in the Persian Gulf, provoked by the war between Iran and Iraq. Operation Cleansweep enabled mines to be cleared in a sea lane of 300 miles as of the Strait of Hormuz (the name was used in 2004 by the Bush administration to indicate the hunt for ‘terrorists’).

Two years later, in 1990, WEU ministers, meeting in Paris on 21 August, agreed to coordinate European naval operations in order to apply a trade embargo on Iraq and Resolution 661 of the United Nations Security Council. An ad hoc group, made up of diplomats and military, coordinated naval operations.

In 1992, the WEU’s Council of Ministers decided that WEU naval forces would go to the Adriatic to monitor the embargo decreed against the ex-Yugoslavia. NATO led its own operation (with roughly the same resources). In June 1993, a single command was put in place. It was Operation Sharp Guard, which began on 15 June 1993. The WEU deployed four ships and a half dozen naval patrol planes. One limited section of WEU staff ensured control of one of the joint naval groups while another was seconded to the NATO headquarters in Naples.