French Read Admiral Jean-Pierre Labonne served for six months as deputy to the head of Operation Atalanta.Europolitics was able to talk freely with Labonne at several meetings, in particular in Djibouti in March, where the French officer agreed to be interviewed.

In April and in the last few weeks, we have seen an increasing number of attacks not just in the Gulf of Aden but also in the Indian Ocean.

This is a spectacular and alarming development. It reinforces our belief that the system needs to be adjusted by creating a better balance between our interventions in two zones: the Gulf of Aden and the Seychelle Islands. The equation is difficult. We can’t lower our guard in the Gulf of Aden. We have planned on strengthening our presence in the south-eastern part of the zone. But this area – the Indian Ocean – is even more immense than the Gulf. We are studying the possibility of using additional air means to allow for wider coverage.

Can an aircraft stop the attacks?

Not automatically. What is important is to identify suspect vessels. The aircraft we use (maritime patrol) is not a combat aircraft but is equipped with all means of detection, from infrared to radar and observers on board. So we have two options: either a frigate is in the zone and we can easily guide it to detect the parent vessel, or there are no means available, in which case we trigger the alert.

The example of the Tanit (a French sailboat seized by pirates in April) demonstrates that yachtsmen are still venturing into the area. What can be done?

We can’t keep a yachtsman from sailing where he pleases but we formally advise those who do not have professional reasons to do so to steer clear of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Because in spite of our efforts the risk remains very high. People need to be aware that this is not really the best place for yachting. The danger is particularly great for sailboats, which are a target of choice due to their slow speed and ease of boarding, but also because a yacht means that there will be someone behind it willing to pay a ransom. The pirates see it as a sailing bank, with the key on the safe, so to speak.

The pirates seem to be well organised.

They use both very unsophisticated means in keeping with their way of life - their arms are quite old - and modern means (satellite telephones, GPS and so on). They’re good sailors. They’re not amateurs, at least for attacking vessels at around 400-500 nautical miles from shore, which requires endurance at sea and a real maritime culture. They are also well organised, although their organisation can vary from one region to the next. Those who attack the vessels are distinct from those who stand guard or negotiate and those who keep the hostages. They also learn very quickly. Our real fear is that the more ransoms are paid, the better equipped they will be for organisational purposes.

What do you recommend to ship owners whose vessels are captured: should they pay the ransom?

We don’t really advise ship owners. They are left completely free and this is their responsibility. The logic is to save the lives of crew members. But by paying a ransom, the dynamic of piracy, the lure of gain, is maintained.

Why do you not intervene militarily?

When the pirates take hostages, the nature of the intervention changes and it is no longer in EUNAVFOR’s remit. The intervention becomes a state responsibility (flag state or state of nationality of the hostages). Not all states are willing or able to intervene. The intervention conditions are less than ideal: far from the usual bases and in unfamiliar surroundings, requiring technical skills and a high level of control. And, most importantly, a high-level political commitment is needed because ship owners tend to negotiate and pay the ransom. The risk of failure, with victims among the crew or the hostages, is considerable. An armed intervention once the pirates are on board is always dangerous. So that is the challenge of our work, reaching the scene before the pirates have a foothold on the vessel. We have to be very fast.

What initial assessment would you make of the operation?

In terms of organisation and build-up, we have managed in just months to build up from scratch a coherent and viable operation with a force at sea. And we have developed cooperation terms with the world of maritime trade, which is very new in itself, because the seafaring world has a tradition of freedom. It has accepted a fair amount of regulation given the risk, such as registration on our MSCHOA system [vessels crossing the zone register their route and the cargo they are transporting in a computerised database - Ed] and the circulation of information.

What about coordination with the other forces present?

Coordination is probably saying a lot. But we regularly trade information not only with NATO and the Americans – which is quite easy – but also with the Russians, the Chinese and the Indians – which is new. And it’s working. When a vessel puts out a distress signal, no one gives a thought to its nationality: whoever is closest goes to its rescue, without hesitation…

The acts of piracy seem endless. Is the military solution a stopgap measure?

We are fully aware that the military operation simply limits the risk, without eliminating it. We all know that a long-term solution requires a comprehensive approach to re-equip Somalia with the instruments of rule of law, justice, a police force, a coast guard capable of controlling not only what happens in the country’s territorial waters, but also in the 200-mile zone (exclusive economic zone). It also requires development, to give the population a source of income through agriculture or fishing. The challenge of changing the situation is huge: people have income of around a dollar a day and a pirate can earn several thousand in a single operation. But Europe can bring about change.