The primary mission of the EU’s Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta operation is to escort World Food Programme (WFP) ships delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia. Before Atalanta, this task was carried out by countries on an individual basis (France, the Netherlands, Canada). But the WFP ran into difficulties, as recently as in 2008, when it was forced to beg each country, in turn, for their help and protection in escorting these ships.

EUNAVFOR now has means to carry out its mission, which is no mean feat. In early May, over 20 ships were escorted to Somalia, delivering 130,000 tonnes of food and allowing about 1.6-1.7 million people to be fed every day. Not long after the mission began, a WFP ship was also escorted to North Korea. EUNAVFOR’s second mission is to guarantee the safety of the “most vulnerable” merchant ships. Of course, as the Atalanta Operation’s Commander, Rear Admiral Philip Jones, explained at the start of the mission, “We cannot claim to eradicate piracy with a few ships. But we will make a useful contribution to countering the phenomenon”. A twin secure corridor (with separate eastbound and westbound transit lanes) has been set up as part of the mission. A corridor was already in place before EUNAVFOR but was shifted further from the Yemeni coast to avoid surprise attacks.

Around a hundred merchant ships have been escorted in some twenty escorts. Even if all the ships escorted have therefore been able to evade attacks from pirates, the pirates have still, sometimes successfully, attacked ships close to these convoys. The work is being coordinated closely with other forces in the area, such as the anti-terrorist coalition, whose HQ is in Bahrain (US Navy) or NATO (which has a Standing NATO Maritime Group in the area). “We share information and intelligence on the pirates’ activity,” explains Rear Admiral Jones. The information is relayed via a secure ‘webchat’. Escorts are, in particular, carried out together with the other ships of the forces in the area (Combined Task Force - CTF - NATO, Russia, India).

The third mission is to deter and detain pirates. This is an aim, which, without being a priority, has today become one of the keys to the success of the operation. The number of pirate attacks has been continuously on the rise for a year (see box) but two factors can help in the assessment of the operation’s effectiveness. Firstly, the level of ‘successful’ attacks has gone down. From nearly one in two being successful, one in four were successful in the first quarter of 2009. Secondly, the number of arrests and of those handed over for trial is significant (108 arrests and 93 pirates handed over for trial – see details below). Finally, Rear Admiral Philip Jones announced that the multinational forces had eliminated four mother ships in early May without bloodshed. In spite of the risks entailed in the operation, only three people have been injured (one sailor and two pirates) in six months. All the other operations taking place over the same period of time have ended in the deaths of pirates. By contrast, hunting down pirates or releasing hostages (see interview with Rear Admiral Labonne) is not normally part of Atalanta’s mission.

HOSTAGES: UP TO THE FLAG STATE

Military intervention in the event that hostages are taken is solely up to the flag state. Few countries have used force, with most preferring to negotiate. There are two exceptions: France and the US. In an epic operation in early April 2008, after freeing hostages from the Ponant (a CMA CGM cruise ship) by paying a ransom, France intervened directly on Somali territory to recover the pirates and part of the ransom. Six pirates were repatriated to Paris for trial. Again, in September 2008, after a yacht, the Carré d’As, was captured by pirates, marine commandos intervened, freed hostages and arrested six pirates (a seventh was killed in the operation). France intervened a third time, in April 2009, when a yacht called the Tanit was taken hostage. The hostages were freed but one was shot and killed during the operation. There was no official identification of who shot the hostage (even if the person seems to be French). Two pirates were also killed and three other arrested. In this type of operation, it is normally the military of the states concerned who act under their own flag. But other ships play a supporting role. For example, during the operation on the Tanit, a German ship, the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, which had a surgical unit, was given a supporting role.

INTERCEPTIONS MADE BY ATALANTA

According to an unofficial estimate by Europolitics,on 26 May 2009, Operation Atalanta has carried out 108 arrests. Of this number, only 14 have been released and disarmed. Seventy-seven were handed over for trial and 17 are waiting to be transferred.

Most of the suspects (52) arrested by Atalanta have been transferred to Kenya – under an agreement signed with the EU – the others (25) to Somalia or to the Seychelles, through some legal or operational sleight of hand. Some were handed over to Somalia and the Seychelles, where there is no legal agreement with the EU, when national ships left the EU operation briefly to make that decision (these pirates are not therefore in EUNAVFOR’s official figures)

The European operation therefore has one of the best records in terms of bringing pirates to trial, with eight out of ten arrested handed over to judicial authorities. According to calculations done by Europolitics, this number comes to seven out of ten for national operations, three out of ten for the US coalition CTF151 and a little more than one out of ten for the NATO operation (NATO’s procedure being a ‘catch and release’ policy).

Transfers to Kenya:

- Nine pirates, arrested on 3 March 2009 by the German frigate Rheinland-Pfalz with the help of a US helicopter from the USS Monterey (from CTF151) after attacking a merchant ship (the MV Courrier) flying the flag of Antigua. The Hamburg prosecutors’ office opened an investigation as the owner of the ship was German. But the German government wanted to hand the pirates over to the Kenyan authorities. The suspects were handed over to the Kenyan police in Mombasa, on 10 March.

- Seven pirates were handed over, on 7 April 2009, by the German frigate Rheinland-Pfalz after an attack on a refuelling ship for the Atalanta fleet, the SPS Spessart, on 29 March. Germany decided against taking up the possible jurisdiction of its courts.

- Eleven men were arrested by the French frigate Nivôse, on 15 April 2009, after an attack on the MV Safmarine Asia, a ship flying the flag of Liberia, and handed over to the Kenyan authorities in Mombasa, on 22 April.

- Eleven men were arrested by the French frigate Nivôse, on 3 May 2009, as they were trying to attack the military ship and handed over – after “reflection” – to the Kenyan authorities in Mombasa, on 8 May. France decided against taking up the possible jurisdiction of its courts.

- Thirteen men arrested on 6 and 7 May 2009 by the Spanish navy after attacks on two ships - the Nepheli (Greek ship flying the flag of Panama) and the Anny Petrakis (Maltese cargo) – were handed over to Kenya by the Marques della Ensanada ship, on 16 May 2009. The 14th pirate arrested was injured during the operation and evacuated to Djibouti. A Spanish judge requested that judgement be made in Spain but the government and the Spanish prosecutor, who were not very keen on the judge’s initiative, were against that.

- Seven pirates arrested by the Swedish corvette, HMS Malmö, on 26 May 2009, after an attack on the Greek ship MV Antonis.

Repatriation to Europe:

- Nine pirates, captured on 22 May by the Italian frigate Maestrale, could be brought to Rome to be tried by the Italian courts, after their attack on the Greek ship Maria K and the American ship Maersk Virginia.

Handed over to authorities in Somalia or the Seychelles:

- Eight Somali pirates, arrested by the small French frigate, Premier Maitre L’Her, on 1 January 2009, after attempting to attack a cargo ship from Panama, the S. Vénus, were handed over to authorities in Puntland.

- Nine suspects were handed over to Somali coastguards by the Floréal, on 29 January 2009, after they attempted to attack the African Rubis, a ship flying under the Maltese flag.

- Nine men arrested by the Spanish frigate Numancia, on 26 April 2009, in a joint operation with the Indian navy after an attack on Italian cruise ship MSC Melody, were handed over to authorities in the Seychelles. Officially, they were released then recaptured immediately afterwards by Seychelles coastguards who were in the vicinity. This was a necessary way round the problem of there not yet being a direct handover agreement of pirates between the EU and the Seychelles.

Freed on the spot:

- Six men arrested by the German ship the Karlsruhe, on 25 December 2008, released following orders from Berlin. Their weapons were destroyed.

- Five men arrested by the Greek ship Psara after an attack on a Norwegian oil tanker flying the Danish flag, the Sigloo Tor, on 30 March 2009.

- Three men arrested by the French frigate Nivôse, on 30 April 2009, on board what seemed to be a mother ship. Life jackets from a ship captured by the pirates were discovered but no weapon on board or tangible proof was found, which meant that they had to be released.

Attacks on the rise

In 2008, the number of acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden has exploded (up by a factor of three by comparison with 2007), according to a report by the International Maritime Bureau. A total of 111 ships were attacked off Somalia (Red Sea and Gulf of Aden) and 43 were hijacked. In addition, there were 17 attacks in the Indian Ocean (Tanzania, Kenya, Seychelles). This upward trend has continued in 2009. In the first quarter of 2009, 114 ships have been attacked and 29 seized. The danger near the Seychelles and in the Indian Ocean has grown markedly, with one attack out of two or three now taking place in that area.

The pirates have between ten and 20 ships and 200 sailors as hostages at any one moment. The total amount of ransoms could be between US$30 million and US$150 million.